1. On the evening of October 28 and overnight into October 29, drones attacked moscow and the Moscow oblast. Mayor Sobyanin reported that “more than a hundred” drones had been intercepted. Aircraft arrivals and departures were restricted at Vnukovo, Domodedovo, and Zhukovsky airports. Local residents reported impacts in Naro-Fominsk. Meanwhile, yesterday, Kyiv Post noted a shift in the priorities of Ukraine’s long-range campaign: following 114 strikes on russian oil refineries since the beginning of the year, attacks on russia’s oil sector ceased in the second half of October, and the new targets became the metallurgical industry. In turn, Zelensky said in an interview with The Sun: “…we are ready for dialogue, we are ready for negotiations in any format, we are even ready to discuss any topics, including those that are sensitive for us… Perhaps discussing some topics is even unfair, but we are ready, because I do not want to create the impression that we are interrupting the negotiation process”. Putin’s aide Ushakov said that European representatives had not been invited to the talks in Abu Dhabi.
These very different developments are grouped under one heading because they show just how strongly the White House influences Ukraine’s defense strategy. Essentially, Kyiv has abandoned the most advantageous tactic of striking russian oil refineries and is entering an “unfair” negotiation process without its European allies, solely to avoid “creating the impression” in Trump’s mind that it is obstructing negotiations. It turns out that all of Ukraine’s current foreign policy and military moves are being made under duress, against the backdrop of White House threats to cut off Starlink and intelligence sharing. Zelensky is operating within the framework of “everything is permitted unless prohibited”, but these boundaries are constantly narrowing and are not producing a swift effect in ending the war.
The attacks on moscow serve the same purpose as the strikes carried out by russians in Ukraine: they shift the costs of war to places where it had previously not been felt in everyday life. The goal is to create a global deterioration in living conditions as an incentive to make compromises in negotiations. And the paralysis of air traffic is indeed an inconvenience for the russian establishment. But the scale of this response is not commensurate with the kremlin’s actions in Ukraine’s rear areas…
2. Sergey Lavrov will lead the russian delegation at the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting on October 30–31 in Atlanta, despite having been under U.S. sanctions since 2022. Earlier, Washington invited vladimir putin to the G20 summit in Miami in mid-December.
This creates an extremely unfavorable backdrop for the expected Ukraine-U.S.-russia talks in Abu Dhabi. It demonstrates that, alongside the trilateral format, Washington and moscow are building their own bilateral relationship — from the “diesel deal” to the invitation for putin to visit Miami. The arrival of russia’s foreign minister in the United States legitimizes the kremlin as a partner rather than a target of sanctions. No one is even talking about isolating the aggressor country anymore. Essentially, the balance of power in Abu Dhabi has already been clearly established: two against one. And that one “lone warrior in the field” will be Kyiv.
3. Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate reported the discovery of a new russian facility for launching strike jet-powered drones near the Millerovo military airfield in the Rostov oblast. According to Ukrainian intelligence, the site will be capable of supporting up to 100 launches per day. In addition, the DIU claims that the new warheads are designed to destroy bridge structures and power transmission line supports.
Russia is increasing the number of drones and improving the infrastructure for deploying them. The new launch center will reduce attack preparation time and increase the intensity of strikes against Ukraine’s eastern and central regions. The combination of jet engines, autonomous navigation, and specialized warheads designed to target energy and transport infrastructure points to the aggressor’s priorities when selecting targets: bridges and power transmission lines.
By Serhii Harmash, editor-in-chief of OstroV