The practice of hybrid negotiations on a
hybrid settlement of a hybrid conflict
Consultative Council
I have mentioned the so-called "Consultative Council" several times already. There was a time when Ukrainians did not need an explanation of what it was. But time passes, so it is appropriate to remind readers of the essence of the issue.
On March 11, 2020, the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk, "with the participation of representatives of certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts" and "guided by the agreements of the heads of state and government of the Normandy Format", adopted a decision to establish the Consultative Council.
"The main task of the Council is to conduct dialogue, consultations, and develop proposals for draft political and legal decisions on conflict settlement in accordance with the Package of Measures. This includes matters relating to the holding of elections in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine.
The Council shall consist, with voting rights, of 10 representatives from Ukraine and 10 representatives from certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, as well as one representative each with advisory voting rights from the OSCE, russia, Germany and France..." - the TCG decision stated.
The publication ZN.ua , whose journalists published the leaked document, summarized it as follows: "Agreements have been signed in Minsk to create a body that formalizes the subjectivity of CDDLO, while russia, in the status of guarantor-observer, has been placed on the same level as Germany, France, and the OSCE".
The recognition of ORDLO as a separate party within the framework of the TCG, as I have mentioned many times before, was moscow's primary objective and a red line for Ukrainian society. Ukrainians did not want russia to be reclassified from a party to the conflict into a mediator, nor did they want russian aggression to be recognized as an "internal crisis". Therefore, a serious political scandal erupted.
"I want to emphasize with full responsibility that there are no steps being taken today that would create a legal framework for representatives of the so-called CDDLO or recognize them in any way. There is no discussion of any direct negotiations", - Head of the Presidential Office Andrii Yermak was forced to explain.
“The idea of this Consultative Council — consider it an idea of a public council where representatives of civil society who enjoy public trust work together. That is the essence of it. As of today, the issue of who will represent interests in this public council from certain districts of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts from the government-controlled part of Ukraine is being resolved. Each delegation has the right to form its own lists of people. These should definitely be lawyers and attorneys who know the law (for example, if the issue is amnesty — criminal law). There should also be, so to speak, representatives of the Donetsk and Luhansk territories. Why couldn't they be athletes, clergy, library employees, or symphony orchestra conductors? People who truly enjoy trust because of the nature of their work”, - explained (or justified himself) in one interview Vice Prime Minister, Minister for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories, and Deputy Head of the Delegation Oleksii Reznikov.
However, the reaction in the country was sharply negative. The “Capitulation Resistance Movement” — at that moment the only coalition of political forces capable of organizing physical protests outside the Office of the President — took the issue under its control. The authorities were forced to take a step back. More precisely, they reinterpreted the idea by introducing us, the internally displaced persons, into the negotiation process as representatives from CDDLO. It looked as though representatives of Donbas civil society had been included in the negotiations, but without formally establishing the Consultative Council.
However, of course, this was not what Kuchma had agreed to in Minsk and not what moscow wanted. Apparently, in order to soften the effect of this retreat for the russians, the Office of the President came up with the idea of establishing a “public dialogue” through another channel — by appointing the first President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, as head of the delegation, and former Prime Minister Vitold Fokin as his first deputy. Why do I think so? You will understand shortly...
The old men
August 3, 2020, was the second time I visited the Office of the President in connection with my work in the delegation. The first time we met at the OP with Yermak and Reznikov was on the eve of our debut at a meeting of the TCG political subgroup, that is, in early June 2020. During all that time, until July 28, the delegation was formally headed by Ukraine’s second President, the 82-year-old Leonid Kuchma. But although four TCG meetings and four political subgroup meetings had already taken place (that is, eight delegation events), I never saw Kuchma even once. People said he would not be returning to work. In reality, the delegation was being led by Vice Prime Minister Oleksii Reznikov. Frankly speaking, we believed that after Kuchma, he would become its head. However, on July 30, Zelensky issued a decree appointing Ukraine’s first President, the 86-year-old Leonid Kravchuk, to the position...
It was for this reason that we gathered at the Office of the President.
“Three hours long was the meeting of our delegation in the Minsk TCG with Kravchuk. Vitold Fokin came with him as well. In what capacity — it was unclear, but from Yermak’s words I understood that he too was being offered a place in the TCG, although he had not yet made a decision.
We got acquainted. For the most part, we were bringing Kravchuk up to speed on current affairs in the subgroups. He voiced some ideas. For example, granting the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts the status of free economic zones. Or ways to make the work of the delegation more open to society. Overall, the impression was favorable. He did not voice or propose anything ‘betrayal-worthy’, I directly asked whether he had contacts with Medvedchuk. The answer that there had been no contacts for four years. Moreover, from his rhetoric one could tell that he watched Medvedchuk’s TV channels, but assessed the information presented there realistically.
Vitold Fokin surprised me. It had been a long time since I had heard the expression ‘the people of Donbas’ in my circle. It was obvious that he watched a lot of television... The impression was that the former PM had arrived not from a villa near Kyiv, but from occupied territory. But that was useful too. The main thing was that he was sincere in his concern for the people and for the country; everything else (if he agreed to work in the delegation) would be erased by the harsh reality of moscow’s unwillingness to make any compromises.
In general, no revolution regarding Minsk is expected. Nor can individual members accomplish one, even at the level of the head of the delegation. Policy continues to be determined by the sitting president. The chief moderator and driving force remains Deputy Prime Minister Reznikov — he has the real mechanisms to do so. Everything else, regardless of who proposes it, is merely ideas for discussion, proposals, probing the opponent, or promises of incentives, nothing more”.
That was how I described the meeting in a diplomatic Facebook post. I think attentive readers understood that the debut of the “old men” (as we called them in the delegation) caused, at least in me, a certain degree of tension. This can be read in the final paragraph. And it grew as their media activity increased.
Naturally, the appearance of two elite pensioners in the TCG sparked a surge of public interest in them. Kuchma and Fokin, bursting with the enthusiasm of newcomers, truly got carried away. Then journalists approached me asking me to comment on the flight of their creative thinking. Moreover, my membership in the delegation made me seem almost like an accomplice to their initiatives. I had to do more than comment — I had to disavow the statements of the new leadership. Me — an ordinary adviser.
August 5, 2020. Facebook: “I’m tired of commenting on the ideas of Kravchuk and Fokin about ‘direct dialogues’, trips to CDDLO, and so on. The enthusiasm of our patriarchs and their tireless production of signals to russia are enough to provoke envy. I can already imagine Kozak’s and Gryzlov’s brains overheating as they try to figure out whether this is a change in Kyiv’s policy or a trick by the new negotiators. Personally, I would like to say this: the proposals and ideas of Kravchuk and Fokin are their personal proposals and ideas — their personal attempt to wear down moscow through an onslaught of meanings. They have not been discussed within the delegation and, at least for now, do not represent the delegation’s position. Moreover, any trips to CDDLO and conversations there do not fall within the competence of the Ukrainian delegation in the Minsk (!) Trilateral (!) Contact Group. CDDLO are not members of the TCG. And consultations with representatives of CDDLO under the Minsk Package of Measures are foreseen only within the framework of the TCG, not through ‘house calls’. Period!
However, I will only welcome it if Vitold Fokin travels to Donbas and sees the reality of the war not only from that side, but also from our side of the line of demarcation”.
The next day, while giving an interview to the well-known journalist Liudmyla Nemyria, I was less diplomatic: “I have a hard time imagining Fokin in the delegation because his views differ sharply from those of the entire delegation. And it is he, first and foremost, who will find it difficult to work in such an atmosphere. We already had — that is, I personally had with him — not exactly a conflict, but some tension at the first meeting when he started using the expression ‘the people of Donbas’ and talking about who was really shelling whom, and what he was being told from there... And I told him, ‘You probably watch too much russian television’. And there was this strange remark (from him): ‘You and I simply come from different positions.’ Different positions? I was born in Yenakiieve, I lived in Donetsk — how can we have different positions? Then from what position are you speaking? I think he simply will not agree to work (in the delegation — author’s note)”.
It must be said that regarding Fokin, I was both wrong and prophetic at the same time. He did agree to join the delegation after all. At first he refused, but then, as he himself stated, he was “persuaded by the guys from Stakhanov”. However, he remained in it for only a month and a half.
And now to why I believe the inclusion of Fokin and Kravchuk in the delegation was an attempt by the Office of the President to implement, one way or another, the idea of the Consultative Council.
Already on August 18, the day the presidential decree appointing Fokin to the delegation was published, Leonid Kravchuk said in a comment to RBC-Ukraine that “Fokin’s main task... is to become a communicator in negotiations between civil society institutions located in the government-controlled and non-government-controlled territories”.
“Vitold Fokin worked in Donbas mines from the age of 16; he personally knows many people there. He traveled a very long and very difficult path from a mine horse-driver (there were horses in the mines back then) to Prime Minister of Ukraine. He is a person with convictions and experience who wants Ukraine to be a state that builds a democratic and civilized way of life. That is precisely why he was offered the opportunity to begin this dialogue”, - Kravchuk explained.
“But Yermak himself cannot make proposals without coordinating them with the president. Because the people who work in the Ukrainian delegation to the TCG are approved by presidential decree. Yermak studied this issue in detail, proposed various options, and in the end Vitold Fokin was approved as the First Deputy Head of the Delegation”, - Leonid Kravchuk clarified, assigning responsibility where it belonged.
It should be noted that all of this was happening and being said BEFORE the first TCG meeting for Kravchuk and Fokin, which took place only the next day, on August 19. In other words — before they had been immersed in reality. At that point, Leonid Kravchuk also held the view that a “dialogue between civil society institutions” was necessary. This can be inferred from Fokin’s own words: “I received an invitation to the Office of the President. There I saw Kravchuk. Andrii Borysovych (Yermak — author’s note) explained that he had invited us to join the TCG. Kravchuk and I met and talked for 6.5 hours. We concluded that we needed to break out of the deadlock in which the delegation had found itself. It was an imitation of activity”.
A 6.5-hour conversation is a sign of like-mindedness. But being an experienced politician and understanding the public consequences of such a maneuver on the Minsk track, Kravchuk immediately shifted responsibility for it onto Fokin, Yermak, and Zelensky. In doing so, he presented the planned maneuver as state policy. Or, more precisely, as the president’s policy, in the implementation of which he, Leonid Kravchuk, was merely a mechanism.
Today I can honestly say that this shift in policy was noticeable even during the first meeting of the delegation with Kravchuk and Fokin in Yermak’s presence. However, when two days later, in an interview with Nemyria, I categorically stated that their ideas were not state policy, I was not being disingenuous. It was simply that after two months in the TCG and the delegation, I already understood that the Minsk process, at least from the internal Ukrainian perspective, was not a diplomatic process but a political one. In other words, it was more open and more sensitive to public opinion than any behind-the-scenes negotiations. Zelensky himself had made it that way. And where there is politics, even kings cannot do everything. Moreover, the more public a process is, the greater the opportunity to influence it. Or rather, to influence the “kings” who determine it. Therefore, I was 100% certain that even if the Office and Kravchuk and Fokin were inclined toward the Consultative Council, that would last only until the first collision with reality — both negotiating reality and domestic political reality.
Therefore, on the one hand, yes — the ideas of Fokin and Kravchuk worried me. On the other hand, I understood that in practical terms they were impossible to implement, and so I calmly countered them with my explanations in the media.
I will say even more: granting subjectivity to the kremlin’s puppets would have provoked, if not open resistance, then sabotage within the delegation itself. Again — for political reasons. After all, Ukraine was represented in the TCG working groups by members of parliament and chairs of parliamentary committees, and they certainly cared about what voters would think of their activities regarding Donbas. This decision (to include sitting MPs from the president’s faction in the TCG) was, for the Office, what is commonly called a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it gave them influence over people whom they had brought (often, as they say, straight from the street) into high politics. But on the other hand, once these people had reached the very top, they no longer wanted to go back “to the street”, and therefore they started looking around...
Of course, in case it became necessary to take unpopular decisions and the political consequences that followed, they could be promised employment and promotion in the “president’s team” (apparently, the existence of this “carrot” was supposed, according to the Office’s calculations, to ensure their unconditional loyalty). However, politics is a cruel world, and not all “fallen pilots” are guaranteed parachutes. The politicians in our delegation knew this…
There were, apparently, other factors of possible resistance as well: from institutional interests to personal relationships…
I will give an example from the above-mentioned debut meeting of the delegation with Kravchuk and Fokin…
Behind the scenes 2
At that meeting I remember Major General of the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) Hennadiy Kuznetsov, who dealt with issues of prisoner exchanges in the humanitarian working group. He came to the meeting at the President’s Office with a suitcase and in camouflage, as if he had just stopped by before a deployment. When the heads of the subgroups were briefing Kravchuk (and in fact reporting to Yermak, who had presented Kravchuk to us as the head of the delegation) on the current situation in their areas, there was a rather tense exchange between Kuznetsov and the head of the Office. I do not remember the details, but Yermak was asking why something had not been done, and Kuznetsov was essentially snapping back rather than answering, from which it was clear that the Office’s instructions were simply being sabotaged (it was unclear whether by the general personally or by the SBU).
After that, however, I did not see Kuznetsov in the delegation again…
Another conclusion I drew at that meeting was that both Kravchuk and Fokin viewed the TCG delegation as a body deciding the fate of Donbas’s future. Like many in Ukraine, they did not understand that we were merely a diplomatic platform, or rather a diplomatic façade for government decisions. We ensured the implementation of state policy, possibly influenced it, but certainly did not shape it!
By the way, it was not only the “old men” who were under illusions about the functions and capabilities of the TCG. The same “debut” meeting of the delegation was attended by Deputy Prime Minister for Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov. At first I could not understand what he was doing there. Then the deputy prime minister asked a question that literally hung in the air in heavy silence without an answer. He said that technically he could deliver any message to our people in the occupied territories, and asked what exactly should be communicated to them. The question was in a practical, not abstract, plane. It was clear that the delegation in diplomatic negotiations could not form the internal political position of the state regarding dialogue with residents of the occupied territories. We were not the ones who passed the language law depriving Russian-speaking citizens of the right to speak their native language at public events in their own country, nor were we the ones who made the prosecutor’s office ignore facts of stigmatization of Donbas residents in the media, calling them “biomass”, “subhuman,” etc. So the question was not for us. But the deputy prime minister, like the newly appointed head of the delegation with his future first deputy, did not understand this. And that says a lot. At the very least, it shows that there simply was no state policy regarding the return of territories occupied by russia. As, by the way, there is none today either. There was only the position of the Office of the President on this issue, but it contained so many nuances and variables…
I want to note: that meeting was the only time the delegation gathered together in full composition.
“Delegation meetings are not held. It is simply impossible to explain, propose, say, or discuss anything with the entire delegation. You can meet separately with Kravchuk or Reznikov, but none of them makes decisions alone. In addition, there is a subjective factor—you were not understood, not heard, not remembered… And in the delegation there are several centers of decision-making, in addition to the main one in the Office of the President, which is completely inaccessible… I think this is done deliberately in order to keep the process under manual control of the Office, so that there are no collegial decisions, no discussions, no clear strategies for everyone”, - I later wrote in my notes.
This shows that the Office of Zelensky, unlike Fedorov, Kravchuk, and Fokin, actually understood our real, technical function.
However, later Yermak himself said this openly when he stated the need for Fokin to leave the TCG. “The Trilateral Contact Group does not make any decisions; it is a logistical platform for coordinating details and agreements reached by the leaders of the ‘Normandy format’” — he stated completely truthfully in his Facebook post.
By Serhii Harmash, editor-in-chief of OstroV