The front remains active across nearly all key areas — from south to north. The russian army continues attempts to advance around Chasiv Yar, presses on the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and has also intensified strikes on the Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts. Simultaneously, information-psychological pressure is mounting: the kremlin is pushing narratives about a "buffer zone" in the Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and a further escalation of the war.
Along the entire line of contact, there is high intensity of fighting and massive attacks involving aviation, guided aerial bombs, drones, and artillery.
Amid these developments, renewed discussions have emerged about a possible russian offensive on Kyiv from Belarusian territory during the joint "Zapad 2025" exercises.
These and other pressing issues were addressed in an interview with OstroV by military expert and Ukrainian Armed Forces reserve colonel Roman Svitan. He assessed the current operational situation, explained the logic of russian troop actions, analyzed possible scenarios for the rest of the summer, and identified the main threats that must already be taken seriously.
— How would you characterize what is currently happening at the front? Is it an active russian offensive?
— It’s a failed start to the summer military campaign by russian forces.
— Why “failed”?
— The point is that part of the resources they had amassed for the active launch of this campaign were burned up before May 9. And they were wasted because they didn’t capture a single new operational line. They just ground their reserves into dust while fulfilling a political order. Not a single political objective was achieved: they didn’t capture the Luhansk or Donetsk oblasts, didn’t push us out of the Kursk and Belgorod directions, didn’t enter the Dnipropetrovsk oblast. In short, the russians achieved practically nothing and wasted their strength. The reserves they had gathered for the summer campaign were simply lost. Still, the summer military campaign has begun — both on their side and ours.
Currently, the russians are hastily forming new reserves to at least catch up by mid-campaign, around August or even September. But they won’t be able to prepare them that fast. They’ll need at least a couple of months. So the real intensification of the offensive as part of the summer campaign is still ahead. This shift was predictable — we talked about it. That’s why we’re still expecting the active phase of the summer campaign around August or September.
— If we return to the current front line — which directions, in your opinion, are the most critical today?
— At the moment, the enemy has only one real objective left: to expand the land corridor. The political goals have already been dropped, May 9 has passed, and now politics as such has taken a back seat.
Their main goal is the expansion of the land corridor by capturing the left-bank part of the Zaporizhzhia oblast and the southwest of the Donetsk oblast. The direction around Zaporizhzhia–Pokrovsk–Kostiantynivka will become the most crucial based on the strategic tasks of the russians.
There is also a secondary direction for the capture of the entire Luhansk oblast, that is Kupiansk–Lyman. The russians will also operate there, as it’s related to the goal of seizing the Luhansk oblast. These are the strategic objectives. Tactical actions, however, depend on where they currently have reserves that can be quickly transferred closer to the front line. Wherever they can move them — that’s where they’ll apply pressure.
The main focus is Kostiantynivka.
— Why Kostiantynivka specifically?
— The Kostiantynivka direction holds back the russian advance on Sloviansk. Right now, they’ll try to take Kostiantynivka. And that includes everything around it, including Toretsk and Chasiv Yar. So the base pressure point will be Kostiantynivka.
Additionally, the russians will try to push our forces south of Pokrovsk to the border of the Donetsk oblast, specifically in the Bohatyr area, a location currently under their special focus.
— And what is currently happening directly in the Pokrovsk area?
— There is a buildup of russian forces in the Pokrovsk–Velyka Novosilka direction. Their main goal is to secure at least one flank — the southern or southwestern. That’s where they’re concentrating and reinforcing. The pressure isn’t directly on Pokrovsk itself; the russians’ main objective there is to push Ukrainian forces out of Bohatyr and then align the front along the Novosilka–Pokrovsk line.
— In your opinion, is it possible to hold this section in the near future?
— If additional forces are not deployed, it is unlikely. Right now, we have a severe shortage of manpower, more precisely of well-trained personnel. The force ratio in the Pokrovsk direction is about 1:7, not in our favor. And we need at least a 1:3 ratio to be able to defend more or less effectively. That’s the standard. Currently, we’re in a situation that’s twice as bad as the standard ratio. But with proper redistribution of forces, we have every chance to hold the Pokrovsk area. We have a 100% chance of holding this sector if we can get to a 1:3 ratio.
— How can that be achieved?
— To achieve this, law enforcement officers must be brought into service. There are simply no other options. We can't buy North Korean soldiers. But we have our own. Hundreds of thousands of law enforcement and security personnel within the country who are trained at least for defensive actions. They don’t need to go on the offensive, just to hold the line. They know how to do that.
If a political decision is made, then Article 24 of the Law on the National Police simply needs to be implemented. Not just the National Police, but all special services must be brought into service: the SSU, the Main Intelligence Directorate, and other security structures. And not just sent to the front line, but officially integrated into the Armed Forces of Ukraine, included in the military structure, in combat units — both as enlisted soldiers and according to their ranks.
— So regular mobilization methods are no longer solving the problem?
— Our regular mobilization methods have already turned into what’s being called “busification” for various reasons, including the fact that the recruitment mechanism was launched too late. By the time it was finally activated, it was already too late. Public negativity was so strong that recruitment failed. And forced mobilization is a different mechanism altogether, and it produces a negative effect.
— Why?
— People who are dragged into buses by force and then jump out of them on the way to the front. They definitely won’t fight. Worse, they dilute the core of the combat units. That’s why it’s critically important for us to deploy not the “busified”, but people who are already ready to fight — our law enforcement officers.
They initially joined the law enforcement system to protect the state and the people. And today we’re facing external aggression. And they are ready. They know how to shoot, they know what a weapon is, and most importantly, they understand what an order is. These are people who were raised with discipline, with loyalty to command. But those who are forcibly drafted into the army often don’t even understand what is expected of them. You need proper training to obey orders. It’s a whole process. Military academies spend up to four years on that. It’s an entire stage of psychological adaptation to carrying out combat missions.
In this context, I can name only one category that is truly ready for this — law enforcement officers. We simply don’t have any other options right now.
Moreover, they are legally obligated to do so because this is stipulated by mobilization directives. This is not just my opinion, it’s a legal requirement. It is written in our laws. That same Article 24 of the Law on the National Police clearly states: under martial law, the police perform military tasks (Article 24 of the Law “On the National Police” states that in the event of a threat to Ukraine’s state sovereignty or territorial integrity, or in case of armed aggression, the police participate in defense, territorial defense tasks, and the implementation of measures related to the legal regime of martial law, if it is declared either across all of Ukraine or in specific regions, – OstroV).
The same applies to other special services. They must be integrated into the Armed Forces of Ukraine. There should be no separate SSU or MID. All of it should be part of the army. Depending on their rank and status, but all of them must perform combat tasks as part of the AFU.
— What is your opinion on the initiative to create volunteer squads to fight drones?
— Extremely negative.
— Why?
— The air defense system is primarily tied to aviation. And in aviation, no kind of partisanship is acceptable. Otherwise, these volunteer formations of territorial communities, which are essentially partisans with machine guns, will start shooting down our own aircraft.
No pilot will take off knowing they might be targeted by their own from below with a machine gun. That is unacceptable. This kind of mechanism can only operate in areas up to the frontline, where our aviation doesn’t work. And typically, it doesn’t get closer than 50 km to the frontline. Within this fifty-kilometer zone, such groups can be used. But even in this case, only as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with centralized command. Otherwise, the idea is not just utopian — it’s catastrophic. It will all end the moment someone shoots down, say, an F-16, a Mirage, or a MiG-29 with a machine gun.
— What alternative can there be, given the mass raids of Shahed drones?
— It’s not about an alternative, but about properly structuring the air defense system. There should be a frontal air defense line along the entire front — from Odesa all the way to the border with Belarus. And it should go about 50 km deep. There need to be short-range anti-aircraft missile systems and those same volunteer formations of territorial communities with machine guns working against UAVs. And no drone should be able to cross that 50-km zone. Those that do break through — that’s where aviation should kick in. But where aviation operates, there must not be a single mobile group. They don’t have a unified IFF (“Identify Friend or Foe”) system.
This is exactly what proper structuring looks like: the frontline zone is for mobile machine-gun groups, the rear is for aviation. Then there will be results. Because aviation will be able to operate calmly, without the risk of being shot down by friendly fire. And mobile groups will secure the front, not letting drones cross the line.
And we need to destroy not only the Iranian-type Shaheds, but also frontline UAVs, FPV drones, Lancets, fiber-optic platforms — everything currently operating on the frontlines. These groups with machine guns can absolutely handle these types of targets.
— So the problem isn’t the lack of people, but the system?
— Of course. It’s all about the system, not the numbers. Right now, we simply don’t have such a system. But if it’s built properly, the pilots will no longer be afraid to fly over their own territory, and drones will barely be able to penetrate deep.
If the frontline zone is saturated with mobile groups armed with machine guns and they shoot down UAVs, this will solve two problems at once: we’ll strengthen our frontline drone defense, and we’ll give our aviation the freedom to perform air defense missions in the rear.
For this, by the way, special corridors are created: at a specific time, in a specific azimuth — all mobile group activity is paused, and the aviation enters. This is how aviation has operated for the last hundred years.
— Why is russia pushing the idea of an offensive on the Dnipropetrovsk oblast?
— It’s pure PR. They’re not planning to go anywhere, it’s just their fetish. They need to show something, create the illusion of success. Essentially, they have two options: either claim they’ll fully capture the Donetsk oblast and reach the Dnipropetrovsk oblast border, or say they’ll enter Dnipropetrovsk without finishing the capture of Donetsk.
But they can’t take the Donetsk oblast, and it’s the same story with the Zaporizhzhia oblast. So they just shift the focus: like, we’ll go into the Dnipropetrovsk oblast and that’ll distract from the failure in other directions. At the same time, they’ve trapped themselves legally, since both the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts are already “written into” the russian constitution, and yet they still can’t take them.
— So you don’t see a real threat to the Dnipropetrovsk oblast?
— I don’t see any threat at all — not to the Dnipropetrovsk, not to Sumy, not to Kharkiv oblasts. And these rumors are being fueled not only by russian media but unfortunately also by some of our own media and politicians. It’s an information-psychological operation.
— As for the Sumy oblast, for example, Deep State shows that there seems to be russian advances, some settlements are being captured…
— In reality, there is no actual advance of russian troops there. The same thing is happening as last year in the Kharkiv oblast. Back then they entered as far as Lyptsi and Vovchansk, hit our redoubts and stopped. Our main lines of defense aren’t on the border itself. They’re built in depth — 5, 10, 15 kilometers in. And the enemy hasn’t even reached them yet. It’s the same now in the Sumy oblast. This is all russian information-psychological warfare — and unfortunately, parts of our own information space are picking it up.
Right now we’re not talking about how russians entered Vovchansk last year. And they went deeper back then than they’ve gone into Sumy now. But that also ended the same: they hit our defenses and stalled. It’ll be the same in the Sumy oblast: they’ll mill around and halt. We’ve already stopped them, and they haven’t even reached the primary line of defense yet.
— Lately, there’s been increasing talk about a potential russian invasion from Belarus during the “Zapad 2025” exercises. How real is that threat?
— That threat doesn’t exist. It’s not even worth discussing, just another PSYOP. Even talking about such topics creates a problem by itself. There’s been no threat from Belarus for four years. And there won’t be. Lukashenko knows full well: if even a single bullet flies from there — both of his oil refineries, his plants — the entire Belarusian economy will be instantly wiped out. Our strike systems can reach any point in Belarus. Unlike russia, where they can’t reach the Urals. And Lukashenko knows this perfectly. So I believe the whole “Belarus threat” narrative is a fabrication by russian and some Ukrainian actors.
— Why would Ukraine do that?
— To scare Ukrainian society, to create an atmosphere of fear. And then, in that context, present a ceasefire as a major victory. Like, “we saved you from an attack from Belarus, we saved Kyiv, we saved Sumy, we saved Dnipro”. Even though no one was actually planning to attack. Some politicians scare the public with “bricks falling from the sky” just so they can later say, “See? Nothing fell — that means we won”.
By Vladyslav Bulatchik, OstroV