Russian forces continue offensive operations in several areas of the Donetsk oblast at once. The most intense fighting is taking place in the areas of Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, and Lyman. The russian army is attempting to advance toward Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk, while simultaneously putting pressure on Ukrainian defenses from the southwest and northeast.
The situation around Kostiantynivka remains difficult. Fighting is taking place directly in the urban area, while russian forces have so far failed to establish full control over the city. At the same time, russia continues to increase the number of strikes on Ukrainian positions and is actively using drones.
Against this backdrop, the Ukrainian military leadership is making changes to the defense command system in the Donetsk oblast. On August 26, Volodymyr Zelensky announced the creation of two reorganized groupings, which will be headed by Brigadier Generals Denys Prokopenko and Andrii Biletskyi.
In addition, russia has been carrying out massive strikes on Kyiv and other regions of Ukraine for several days, using large numbers of attack and jet-powered drones. In just four days, russia launched around 1,500 drones at the capital and surrounding regions, more than half of them jet-powered. The attacks caused damage to civilian infrastructure and disruptions to the capital’s operations.
In an interview with OstroV, military expert Roman Svitan spoke about how he assesses the current situation on the frontline, how likely the further loss of Kostiantynivka is, what could change the situation in the Donetsk oblast, as well as why russia is carrying out massive strikes on Kyiv and what burden they place on Ukraine’s air defense system.
— How do you assess the situation on the frontline as of today, and which areas are the most difficult right now?
— The main direction of movement of russian forces is from Kostiantynivka toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Russians are building up their grouping toward Kostiantynivka through the Pleshchiivka area. Their next plan is to expand into a semi-encirclement around Kostiantynivka, approach Druzhkivka, and then move toward Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. This is the main direction of deployment of russian forces.
In order to push our troops out of the Sloviansk and Kramatorsk area, they will advance in a broad pincer movement, in what is known as a semi-encirclement, from the southwest.
The Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad direction, toward Dobropillia and then on to Kramatorsk, is also an advance from the southwest. The Pokrovsk direction is currently seeing approximately the same level of activity as the Kostiantynivka direction. Russians have positive momentum in all directions, meaning they are advancing everywhere, albeit with heavy losses. We are slowly withdrawing from some positions.
Another area is the Kupiansk–Lyman direction, northeast of Sloviansk. Here, too, the russians will attempt to advance further. At this stage, russian activity in the Lyman area is constantly increasing. Their momentum is also positive: there is some advance, although at heavy cost.
Thus, we see constant movement along the southeastern section of the frontline — from Pokrovsk to Kupiansk. At the center of this section is the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration. The enemy is attempting to reach it directly, as well as bypass it from the southwest and northeast. This situation was predictable. In principle, it was clear that this would be the russians’ main task.
— Is the advance proceeding evenly, or is there a slowdown/acceleration somewhere?
— It is approximately the same everywhere. If we talk about the overall dynamics along the section from Pokrovsk to Kupiansk, there is a steady buildup of troops everywhere. The main strategic reserves are being redeployed. It can be said that the summer-autumn military campaign has already begun: there is an advance everywhere, but it is very insignificant — 100–200 meters a day or one or two tree lines a week. But it is steady.
The russians are losing approximately 1,000 people a day in this section. At the same time, these 1,000 people roughly give them about 100 meters of advance.
— According to your forecasts, should we expect increased pressure from the russians in the autumn?
— No, it is already at its maximum level. The pressure can only be increased if the russians find a weak spot somewhere in our frontline and attempt to organize what is known as an operational breakthrough.
However, given the density of our troops and the properly constructed defensive positions, they are unlikely to find such a gap. Again: an increase is possible if they break through our frontline with the units that are currently at the forefront. Then strategic reserves will be thrown in to develop the operational breakthrough. That is when there will be a breakthrough and an increase in the pace of advance. For now, at this stage, nothing indicates that the russians will succeed anywhere.
— Can we already speak of the loss of Kostiantynivka?
— We do not fully control the settlement itself, but the russians have not captured it yet either. Approximately one-third of the city is under our control — mainly thanks to the work of drones. Some positions remain there, and fighting is ongoing for the heights that allow us to hold the northern Kostiantynivka line. But we certainly no longer have full control of the city itself. In other words, the city is currently in transition, but the dynamics are positive for the russians.
The enemy is constantly taking 100 meters a day: a street here, two streets there, several houses somewhere else. Based on this dynamic, it can be assumed that after some time, possibly in a month and a half to two months, we will completely lose Kostiantynivka in terms of our troops being stationed there.
But the city will remain under our operational fire control using drones. It will leave the engagement zone of tactical-level drones completely only when the enemy approaches closer to Druzhkivka — not earlier. So this is a loss stretched out over time, which can be calculated: the city may ultimately be lost, probably closer to winter.
— How do you assess the appointment of Denys Prokopenko and Andrii Biletskyi to command positions in the Donetsk oblast? What do you expect from this change in command?
— From the standpoint of management organization, this is a positive development. The Donetsk direction is the main one, and it has already outgrown the corps-level command structure and requires an army-level or even front-level format. According to the rules of the military hierarchy, several corps are combined into an army, and several armies into a front.
The corps-level command structure is already insufficient for this direction. It is quite sufficient, for example, in the Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia, or Kherson directions.
But in the Donetsk direction, where the russians’ main offensive and the enemy’s main forces are now concentrated, a different level of command is required. If we look at the overall frontline from Pokrovsk to Kupiansk, more than half a million russian servicemen are deployed there, including in the depth of the second echelon. In other words, we are talking about a russian formation already at the army level.
We also need to establish an army-level or front-level command system. This appointment will bear fruit, because both Denys Prokopenko and Andrii Biletskyi are commanders with a successful combat background in carrying out combat missions, and they have a sufficiently professional personnel base of combat units and corps. In addition, they have what is known as a “bench”.
— What do you mean?
— I mean lower-level commanders and their subordinates who have been carrying out combat missions alongside them for the past three or four, and sometimes five, years. They know each other well, so these commanders can later be appointed as corps commanders or scale up the command structure to the army or front level.
This is a sound approach, when commanders are not sent down from above or brought in from outside, but are allowed to grow within their own command hierarchy, where they have risen from battalion commanders to unit commanders. They do not need to build new teams from scratch — they already have them.
For example, a battalion commander becomes a regiment commander, then the commander of an entire unit, and continues to rise, expanding his command and bringing along successful commanders with whom he has already fought. He does not need to create a new command group or a new team — he already has one.
Both Prokopenko and Biletskyi have successful teams with whom they have been fighting for several years. They will simply rise through the ranks. This is a very sound approach.
— What are your main expectations from their work?
— First, reducing losses in personnel and territory. Second, increasing the effectiveness of defensive operations. At this stage, our main task over the past year and a half to two years has been precisely defense: holding positions and grinding down russian forces. They have been quite effective at this.
Knowledge of the terrain is also a very important factor. Biletskyi and Prokopenko, for example, have recently been primarily focused on Donbas and know the geographical features of the area where the fighting is taking place very well. This is also a positive factor.
— Do you think these appointments could be a signal to putin and the international community that surrendering Donbas is out of the question?
—Linking the new appointments to some kind of foreign policy signals is the same as linking them to the fact that the sun rose in the east this morning. It would have risen anyway.
Our tasks are completely independent of what putin thinks or plans. The main objective of the defending side — and this is written in all military art textbooks of the past thousands of years — is to destroy and grind down the forces of the advancing enemy. Any advancing army is better equipped and superior in numbers; otherwise, it simply would not be advancing. Accordingly, our key task at the current stage is to exhaust and grind down the enemy’s resources. We are currently precisely in this time frame.
— More and more reports are emerging about a possible russian offensive toward Chernihiv and Kyiv. Zelensky and the military command are also talking about it. How realistic is such a scenario, in your view?
— Let’s speak frankly: when there is a need to shift the focus of attention away from corruption scandals in the president’s inner circle and the Office of the President, a kind of “smoke grenade” is launched. This trick has been used before. Let me remind you that the topic of an offensive from Belarus toward Kyiv and Chernihiv was first activated precisely when arrests and investigations of officials began.
The only purpose of such leaks is to frighten Kyiv residents and distract the press from the issue of corruption. And it works, because now you are asking me not about the latest revelations in the Office of the President, but about a hypothetical offensive.
Look, someone may have a plan to occupy Mars. Is it feasible at this stage? No.
The russians have plans to occupy Europe, the United Kingdom, or reclaim Alaska. But does it make sense to discuss these plans if there are no technical capabilities or preparatory actions to implement them?
Until the rocket has been built, talk of flying to Mars is simply nonsense or an attempt to distract attention from the embezzlement of funds allocated for its construction.
A similar picture can be observed here. To shift the focus away from corruption proceedings within the authorities, yet another story about russia’s plans to seize Kyiv is launched. Of course, they have such plans — they have existed since 1991. But do they currently have a grouping capable of launching an offensive on Kyiv? No. Are any preparatory measures being carried out? No. Therefore, there is currently no basis for discussing this either.
— What is the purpose of russia’s continuous and massive attacks on Kyiv? In your opinion, what objective is moscow pursuing?
— The purpose of the terrorist strikes is obvious. Kyiv was not chosen by chance: it is the place with the highest population density in the country, especially as the capital. Accordingly, the psycho-emotional and social impact of missile and drone strikes is greatest here.
— And what is the purpose of setting precisely such a task?
— The main goal of the enemy is to push Ukrainian society toward capitulation. Because now the issue of some kind of negotiations has arisen again, and this idea has once again started being actively promoted. The most interesting thing is that negotiations and contacts with the russian side are being pursued by Kyrylo Budanov — this is his area. He tries, at least, to find some kind of contact everywhere and stop the hostilities, to say: we are ending the struggle for the occupied territories.
To increase this pressure and break resistance inside the country, such an informational and psychological context is being created.
— From the point of view of using a large number of jet-powered drones, is there also a task of depleting our air defense system?
— Yes, this is also a purely military issue. The use of a large number of jet-powered drones is aimed at depleting our medium- and long-range air defense systems.
That is, we have to use missiles against jet-powered drones, while those missiles are needed to counter the enemy’s cruise missiles.
Russians understand that the maximum number of our surface-to-air missile systems is located precisely around Kyiv. They are now trying to deplete our stocks so that we launch all these expensive missiles supplied to us at jet-powered drones.
— Why do we have to spend expensive missiles?
— Such drones have a high speed, and intercepting them with an ordinary small-arms mobile fire team or interceptors is difficult — we have to use missile weapons.
At one point, we went down the wrong path by betting exclusively on the production of lightweight interceptor drones. This was a mistaken concept, as a result of which we lost time.
Russians took a different approach in this regard. They modernized their systems to the level of short-range air defense systems with cheap radio-command-guided missiles (such as the TKB-1055 micro-missiles for the "Pantsir-SM"). The cost of such a missile is incomparably lower than the price of any UAV. This allowed them to build a layered defense line around moscow and effectively intercept dense waves of our UAVs.
This is a serious miscalculation by Ukraine’s relevant leadership. While russians created a good system mainly at the expense of these missiles, our leaders were making money on the production of interceptor drones, which may now be lying around in huge quantities without demand and may not be needed at all. Because what is actually needed are short-range air defense systems — such as the "Pantsir-SM" or, for comparison, the French Crotale system that is being supplied to us.
We need to build a system based on radar systems with radio-command guidance and equip them with our own cheap short-range missiles. Until we get there, we have to spend expensive surface-to-air missiles (for NASAMS and IRIS-T systems), which are vitally necessary to repel attacks by the enemy’s cruise and ballistic missiles.
By Vladyslav Bulatchik, OstroV