The russian-Ukrainian war more and more resembles the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939. The motives for the attack are similar, as are the kremlin’s plans, their inability to realize them, and even the behavior of the West and the superpowers (only now China plays the role of Germany, effectively using the russian federation for a proxy war with the US).
Moscow’s demands for the transfer of territories not yet seized by moscow in exchange for “peace” make this analogy almost absolute. It turned out that in more than 80 years, the kremlin’s creativity has not advanced one iota.
Therefore, to look into the prospects for the development of both the war and the “peace negotiations” with moscow, it is enough to turn to historical primary sources. In particular, to the memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army of that period.
At times, these are painful analogies, but only their understanding will allow Ukrainians to accept reality, see the prospects for its development and – most importantly – adjust them.
We publish quotes from Mannerheim’s memoirs with minor abridgments.
“The prestige of the Soviet Union demanded victory, and we had to expect that the pressure from its side would soon multiply many times over”.
“At the final stage of the war, the weakest point was not the lack of materials, but the shortage of manpower. The front stretched out, all available troops were already engaged, and the men were mortally exhausted… As long as the army was not defeated, we still had a diplomatic trump card in the form of the threat of intervention from the Western powers; the best way out of the situation was to try to end the hostilities. The irresistible force of our resistance was the prerequisite for such a decision, which would preserve the independence of our country and prevent complete defeat”.
"On what was the (negative – ed.) assessment of the Red Army based, which became widespread after the Soviet-Finnish winter campaign? The first thing that caught the eye was the disproportion between the enormous effort and the negligible result".
"The capture of the entire country… turned out to be an unattainable goal. In this situation, the kremlin considered it convenient to probe the possibilities of ending the war on terms favorable to the Soviet Union".
"The minimum Soviet condition was not limited to the transfer of the Hanko Peninsula alone. In addition to this, the Soviet government demanded the border be moved to the 'line of Peter the Great', which had been established by the Treaty of Nystad in 1721… The conditions grew harsher".
"At the first meeting on March 8 in the kremlin with representatives of the Soviet government, our delegation learned that the preliminary conditions communicated through Stockholm turned out to be nothing like the ones now presented… The russians demanded the transfer of large areas of territory… Molotov, by the way, said that this omission should probably be attributed to the poor memory of Kollontai".
"The additional demands could, not without reason, be considered a sign that the peace moscow sought was meant only to secure a respite for the Soviet Union".
"The size of the transferred territory amounted to 4,000 square kilometers, and the number of people living there made up 12% of the entire population of the country… Finland’s strategic position suffered a crushing blow".
"In the international arena, the most important consequence of the Winter War was the decline of the prestige of the Soviet armed forces. The political outcome of the Winter War for Finland itself was, above all, the preservation of independence, bought at a high price".
"The new border left the country open to attack… The peace treaty deprived us of security and freedom of foreign policy".
"In the morning of June 22 (1941 – ed.), the russians began bombing and shelling purely Finnish targets… The attacks on Finnish territory on June 22 prompted the foreign ministry to issue a note of protest. The USSR ambassador in Helsinki refused to accept it, declaring that there had been no bombings, on the contrary, Finnish aircraft had flown over the territory of the Soviet Union…"
"As the ambassador told me, he was ashamed that the Soviet Union, with the support of his country, had gained such power, since without America’s help it would have been defeated".
"Our country was a pawn in the political game of the great powers, and not a single great power disdained to use a small country for its own interests".
"The Winter War, if viewed in relation to the conflict between the great powers, has parallels in the history of Europe. Just as the Second World War was in its main features a repetition of the Napoleonic wars, so the fate of Finland then and now was influenced by the same factors. Like Napoleon, Hitler aimed to neutralize russia for the time of the impending struggle with the West. Both in 1807 and in 1939 this was done by granting russia freedom of action with regard to Finland. The unleashing of war did not run counter to Germany’s interests; it was advantageous for it that an unreliable ally should tie down significant forces in a war against Finland. The same was sought by Napoleon, whose plans included the conquest of Spain, while russia in 1808–1809 was tied up in war with Sweden and Finland"…
By Serhii Harmash, editor-in-chief of OstroV